University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2018

The New(Clear?) Electricity Federalism: Federal
Preemption of States’ “Zero Emissions Credit”
Programs
Joel Eisen
University of Richmond, jeisen@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joel B. Eisen, The New(Clear?) Electricity Federalism: Federal Preemption of States’ “Zero Emissions Credit” Programs, 45 Ecol. L.Q.
Currents 149 (2018).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

The New(Clear?) Electricity Federalism:
Federal Preemption of States’ “Zero
Emissions Credit” Programs
Joel B. Eisen*

Two pending federal appellate cases involving Illinois and New York laws,
Old Mill Creek v. Star and Coalition For Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman
respectively,1 involve the conflict between federal authority over the electric grid
and state laws supporting nuclear power plants. The issues are nearly identical in
both cases.2 In Illinois, New York, and other states,3 aging nuclear plants are
struggling to stay in business. These plants generate electricity and sell it in

* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks Ari Peskoe, Emily
Hammond, Dick Pierce, and Shelley Welton for their insights, as well as the participants in the Harvard
Environmental Law Program’s October 2017 workshop on “Regulatory Paths Forward for a Cleaner
Grid,” and the panelists and attendees at the Vermont Law School’s October 2017 symposium on “The
Energy Transition,” at which the author presented on this topic.
1. Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, 2017 WL 3008289 (N.D. Ill.), appeal docketed, No. 17-2445
(7th Cir. July 18, 2017); Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017).
2. Besides preemption issues, the cases raise Dormant Commerce Clause challenges, which are
addressed separately in Sam Kalen & Steven Weissman, The Electric Grid Confronts the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. CURRENTS (2018); see generally Felix Mormann, Constitutional
Challenges and Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2017)
(discussing Constitutional challenges to state clean energy policies).
The District Court decisions also hold that the Supremacy Clause bars private causes of action for
preemption under Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) and the courts’
reading of the FPA, which creates no rights for individual citizens to assert preemption claims. See Jim
Rossi, The Brave New Path Of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 462 (2016) (discussing this issue
and finding that its resolution is “not at all clear”). This Article proceeds under the assumption that the
preemption issues require resolution regardless of the disposition of the Armstrong issue.
3. See Peter Maloney, Feud of the Year: Nuclear and coal vs. competitive markets, UTILITY DIVE
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/feud-of-the-year-nuclear-and-coal-vs-competitivemarkets/508266/ (describing support efforts underway in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in addition
to those in New York and Illinois). Connecticut’s General Assembly recently passed a bill that on its face
would establish a system of zero-carbon procurement for the state, but which in reality would support the
state’s only nuclear power plant. Mark Pazniokas, Millstone bill passes House, goes to governor, THE CT.
MIRROR (Oct. 26, 2017), https://ctmirror.org/2017/10/26/millstone-bill-passes-house-goes-to-governor/
(discussing SB-1501, Conn. Gen. Assembly, Sess. Year 2017). The CEO of New Jersey’s utility, PSEG,
recently claimed its nuclear plants would not survive without subsidies. Peter Maloney, PSEG CEO:
Salem, Hope Creek nukes will close absent subsidies, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pseg-ceo-salem-hope-creek-nukes-will-close-absentsubsidies/512345/.
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regional wholesale electricity markets that grid operators known as “independent
system operators” (ISOs) and “regional transmission organizations” (RTOs)
administer.4 Competition in these markets, primarily with low-priced natural gas
but also with renewables, has lowered prices and left the nuclear plants short of
recovering their high operating and capital costs.5
Concerned about this, the states are subsidizing these plants. The plaintiffappellants in Star and Zibelman argue that the authority of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) over the wholesale electricity markets under
the Federal Power Act (FPA) preempts these state subsidies.6 This Article
proposes and explains a test for resolving the upcoming appeals that turns on the
state’s conscious disregard of FERC’s authority. If a state law explicitly and
consciously aims to directly affect wholesale market prices, terms, or conditions,
its subsidy program is impermissible as an intrusion on FERC’s regulatory turf.
It further contends that only this test can harmonize three recent Supreme Court
decisions on the intersection of state and federal jurisdiction over the electric
grid, preserve valuable state policy experimentation, and set a narrowly defined
preemption standard that avoids unintended consequences in future litigation.
Applying the test to the state nuclear subsidies, this Article concludes that federal
law preempts them and that the District Courts’ decisions to the contrary were in
error.
The subsidy programs are similar in both states. New York and Illinois
require utilities and other companies that deliver electricity to customers to
purchase “zero emissions credits” (ZECs) from the affected plants, giving them
an additional revenue stream.7 “Zero emissions” recognizes that these plants are
a large source of carbon-free electricity generation.8 In both states, nuclear power
makes up a significant percentage of both total and clean electricity generation,9
4. Today, seven regional grid operators (ISOs and RTOs) operate wholesale markets and serve
almost two-thirds of the nation. Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade In Electric Power, 2018
UTAH L. REV. 49 (2018); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1792–93 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform
the Electric Grid]; Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO),
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (last updated Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/rto.asp. For convenience, this Article will refer to the grid operators as “RTOs.” For a discussion of
these markets and their operations, see Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in
the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016).
5. Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8
GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY AND ENVT’L L. 3, 17 (Winter 2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual Electricity
Federalism Is Dead]; Emily Hammond, The Energy In-Betweens 14–15 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with
author).
6. Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *5; Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 563.
7. New York accomplished this through an administrative order of the state’s Public Service
Commission. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, Cases 15E-0302 & 16-E-0270 (Aug. 2016). The Illinois program was embodied in the Future Energy Jobs Act, 20
ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5).
8. Nuclear
Power
and
the
Environment,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_environment.
9. In 2014, for example, the three New York plants eligible for ZECs supplied 16% of electricity
generated and delivered in the state. N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., STAFF WHITE PAPER ON CLEAN ENERGY
STANDARD 29 (2016); cf. Hammond, supra note Error! Reference source not found., at 14 (“In New
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and as a result, the states believe that nuclear plants are an important “bridge” to
a clean energy future.10
At first, New York and Illinois attempted to fix the value of ZECs at the
difference between the affected plants’ costs and revenues.11 New York then
recognized that the Supreme Court’s Hughes decision effectively foreclosed that
approach, for reasons discussed below;12 and the Illinois legislative proposal
aiming to make up revenue gaps failed to become law.13 So both states revised
their pricing formulas to set the ZEC price initially at the “social cost of carbon”
(SCC), a measure of the amount of damage a ton of carbon dioxide emissions
causes.14 New York, which belongs to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), subtracts RGGI revenues in the first two-year period.15 Under both new
formulas, “the math itself includes the wholesale markets.”16 Prices may be
adjusted under formulas tied to indices of wholesale electricity prices, although
the two states do this slightly differently. New York’s ZEC price adjusts after the
first two years by accounting for projected wholesale energy and capacity market
revenues.17 Illinois uses a “price adjustment” derived from two different indices
that account for prices in the PJM and MISO energy and capacity wholesale
markets.18

York, nuclear power represents 59% of non-emitting generation; in Illinois, nuclear power provides over
90% of non-emitting generation”).
10. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 19; Hammond, supra note 5Error!
Reference source not found., at 14.
11. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20.
12. Id. (noting that the original New York formula “could not have survived scrutiny under
Hughes”).
13. In 2015, the state’s utility commission issued a report that nuclear plants’ falling revenues
justified action. ILL. COMM. COMM’N ET AL., POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
33–34 (Jan. 5, 2015). Then, Exelon (the power plants’ owner) and the utility, Commonwealth Edison,
promoted a “Next Generation Energy Plan” (NGEP) that was introduced in the Illinois Legislature. The
NGEP bill included a “Zero Emission Standard,” that, like the original design of the New York program,
would have covered the nuclear plants’ revenue shortfalls.
14. ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, supra note 7, at 50–51; Future Energy Jobs
Act, 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(B). See INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE
GASES, TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (May 2013, revised July 2015)(establishing the SCC); Hearing on S.
1857, S. 203, S. 839, and S. 1934 Before the S. Comm. on Envt. and Pub. Wks., Subcomm. On Clean Air
and Nuclear Safety, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Emily Hammond, Glen Earl Weston Research
Professor of Law, The George Washington Univ. Law School at 5) (noting that, “The SCC was developed
by an interagency working group, subjected to peer review, and upheld in federal court.”).
15. ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, supra note 7, at 51; see Auction Prices,
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results (last visited
Dec. 5, 2017).
16. Hammond, supra note 5, at 15.
17. ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD, supra note 7, at 51.
18. Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(B)(i)-(iii). See Brief of Independent Market
Monitor for PJM as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Electric Power Supply
Association, et al. v. Star, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir. Sept. 5, 2017) (noting that, “[t]he amount of the subsidy
is tied directly to market prices, termed the ‘baseline market price index’ which equals $31.40 per MWh.
The baseline market price index is equal to the PJM energy price in Illinois plus the average of the MISO
and PJM locational capacity market prices.”); Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project
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The states cleverly designed ZECs to resemble existing state clean energy
programs, even mimicking “credit” terminology. For this reason, ZECs are easily
confused with renewable energy credits (RECs), but the two are quite different,
as discussed below in Part III. Regardless of the environmental justifications, the
ultimate purpose of ZECs is unmistakable: to keep affected plants from failing
by making up their revenue shortfalls.19 Unlike REC programs, ZECs explicitly
aim to cure perceived market shortcomings by giving plants more
compensation.20 This “self-conscious purpose of preserving baseload generation
that is struggling on the markets”21 distinguishes ZECs from other state green
energy programs, which do not take market prices into account, and makes them
perhaps the “most controversial” state energy programs.22
And ZECs are just the start. States are increasingly contemplating “aroundmarket” policies that subsidize specific power plants and “interfere with, or
operate in spite of, the wholesale markets.”23 States justify these policies with
concerns about jobs and grid reliability, in addition to emissions.24 These
initiatives can influence wholesale market outcomes because “any state policy
that adds or subtracts from a generator’s costs can affect the outcomes in the
regional market.”25
There is considerable unease about this interaction between state policies
and the markets. Many have called into question how – or even whether – the

of Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) (describing the
payment structure).
19. Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 2 (“Regardless of the specific
rationales offered for the subsidies, the proposed solution for the selected generating units is to provide
out of market subsidies in order to keep uneconomic units in the market.”); Eisen, Dual Electricity
Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20; (“it is precisely [the plants’] alleged failure to cover their costs
in the wholesale markets that has prompted the call for subsidies.”).
20. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20; Hammond, supra note 5, at 18.
The development of the Illinois ZEC program illustrates this vividly. When the NGEP legislation failed,
Exelon announced that its power plants would be closed. RAYMOND L. GIFFORD & MATTHEW S. LARSON,
STATE ACTIONS IN ORGANIZED MARKETS: STATES STRIVE TO “FIX” MARKETS AND RETAIN BASE LOAD
GENERATION 3 (2016). Subsequently, stakeholders in Illinois developed the Future Energy Jobs Act, with
a myriad of provisions, including the new ZEC design.
In New York, the state had also made it clear that nuclear plants’ financial struggles on wholesale markets
warranted action. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, ORDER FURTHER EXPANDING SCOPE OF
PROCEEDING AND SEEKING COMMENTS, Case 15-E-0302, at 4 (Feb. 24, 2016) (clean energy standard
proceedings expanded for this reason).
21. Hammond, supra note 5, at 12.
22. Welton, supra note 18, at 18.
23. Hammond, supra note 5, at 12; see also GIFFORD & LARSON, supra note 20, at 2 (referring to
state initiatives as “around market” proposals); PJM Interconnection, Context for PJM Market Design
Proposals Responding to State Public Policy Initiatives
2 (June 12, 2017)
https://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170612-context-for-pjm-marketdesign-proposals-responding-to-state-public-policy-initiatives.ashx (noting that this new variety of state
policies differs from other initiatives of recent years because it “has involved explicit, legislatively-driven
subsidies for specific generating units.”).
24. SARAH K. ADAIR & FRANZ T. LITZ, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIONAL
ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND STATE POLICIES 2 (Nov. 2017).
25. Id. at 7.
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two can coexist going forward.26 And FERC recently convened a technical
conference to brainstorm solutions, with no clear outcome.27 As a result, Star
and Zibelman are not simply about whether Illinois and New York can support a
handful of failing nuclear power plants. They are some of the first encounters in
what will shape up to be a lengthy dialogue over the boundaries between state
energy programs and the federally regulated wholesale markets. They will not
be the last, as challenges to the former will be more frequent.28
We do not operate on a blank slate, as the Supreme Court has issued three
decisions in the past two years that define the dividing line between state and
federal electricity jurisdiction.29 As several commentators have noted,30 this
makes conflict preemption the most appropriate lens through which to resolve
these cases. This is implied preemption that occurs either when it is impossible
for someone to comply with both state and federal laws, or when state law
thwarts the purposes and objectives of federal law.31 Rather than simply apply
general preemption principles, this Article conforms its analysis to the Supreme
Court decisions with a test that harmonizes all three.32 It calls for precluding the

26. See, e.g., Welton, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that, “variegated state policies present a challenge
to the smooth functioning of U.S. electricity markets”); ADAIR & LITZ, supra note 24, at 7; Miles Farmer,
State Policies and Electricity Markets: Harmony or Conflict?, NRDC BLOG (May 8, 2017),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/miles-farmer/state-policies-and-electricity-markets-harmony-or-conflict.
Former FERC Commissioner Tony Clark recently stated that,
From Illinois and New York, where nuclear generators stand to receive millions of dollars in state
sponsored subsidies, to states in New England and the Mid-Atlantic, where massive out of market
contracts and payments threaten the underpinnings of price formation in both the energy and capacity
markets, there is a very real concern and possibility that certain wholesale electricity markets will become
so dysfunctional as to undermine the just and reasonable standard that FERC is duty-bound to uphold.
TONY CLARK, REGULATION AND MARKETS: IDEAS FOR SOLVING THE IDENTITY CRISIS 6 (2017).
27. FERC held the two-day technical conference on May 1-2, 2017. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n,
State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO New England Inc., New York Independent System
Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. AD17-11-000; see Gavin Bade, Anxiety
common, consensus elusive over power market reforms at first day of FERC conference, UTILITY DIVE
(May 2, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/anxiety-common-consensus-elusive-over-powermarket-reforms-at-first-day-of/441753/ (summarizing the discussion).
The difficulty of harmonizing state policies and the markets is shown in FERC’s action following the
technical conference, in which it invited comments on five different potential policy paths going forward.
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, Notice Inviting Post-Technical Conference Comments (May 23, 2017),
https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170523170542-AD17-11-000PostTC.pdf
28. Hammond, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that these policies “invite scrutiny”); Welton, supra note
19, at 45 (noting that, “There is now a profusion of litigation challenging state clean energy policies under
Hughes’ logic.”).
29. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016); FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136
S. Ct. 760 (2016); ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
30. See generally Rossi, supra note 2; Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellees, Electric Power Supply Association, et al. v. Star, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir.
Nov. 3, 2017).
31. ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1595.
32. Welton, supra note 19, at 45 (noting that the three must be integrated). The process of
harmonizing all three decisions is essential, given their short timeframe and interlocking references.
Hughes, for example, reiterates the ONEOK emphasis on “the importance of considering the target at
which the state law aims in determining whether that law is pre-empted.” [emphasis in original]. Hughes,
136 S. Ct. at 1298 (quoting ONEOK, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1599).
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states from taking actions that intrude the most on FERC’s authority—in one
commentator’s words, those actions that “aim[] directly at ‘fixing’” a perceived
shortcoming of the wholesale markets.33 The Article demonstrates that this is
precisely what ZEC programs do.
The states made no secret that they believed ZECs were necessary because
the plants are uneconomic in the wholesale markets. From the start, they
proposed to make up the difference between costs and market revenues. The
revised formulas for calculating ZECs that incorporate indices, estimates, and
forecasts of market prices are just a less obvious way of achieving the same goal.
Because this consciously disregards wholesale market results,34 this Article
argues that federal law preempts the ZEC laws and other around-market policies
that attempt to achieve similar results.
Part I of this Article discusses the three recent Supreme Court decisions
involving electricity law. In Part II, and continuing into Part III, the Article
discusses the test proposed above, and argues that it can meet three different
goals. First, it harmonizes the Supreme Court decisions, which express solicitude
for both the wholesale markets and state policies, but aim to protect the markets
from interference. Second, it is limited in its scope of preemption, reflecting a
reluctance to establish new bright lines that is especially critical in the new era
of concurrent jurisdiction, under which the states and FERC act simultaneously
and each can influence the other. Finally, Part III addresses ZEC defenders’
background concern that if this credit program is disallowed, the states will be
unable to promote and value carbon-free generation. Under the test articulated
here, the states retain considerable latitude to promote clean energy, as long as
they do not directly reference the wholesale market in their design. Indeed, under
the test proposed in this Article, RECs continue to be permissible and ZECs
would be, too, if they did not reference the markets.
I.

JUDGING ZECS AGAINST A BACKDROP OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
AND POLICY INNOVATION

The three recent Supreme Court decisions in electricity law signal a new era
of electricity jurisprudence. Far from confirming the status quo, the Court
announced that the split between state and federal jurisdiction over the electric
grid is no longer clear.35 All three decisions recognize that the states and FERC
have significant responsibilities in the electric grid, but the Court has scrapped
the jurisdictional bright line. This new electricity federalism is best described as
“concurrent.”36 In this new interdependent system, state and federal actors may
take actions simultaneously and have impacts on the other. We have decades to

33.
34.

Hammond, supra note 5, at 12.
Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that, “Illinois is
setting what it considers the just and reasonable price for wholesale power for these units. That is a FERC
decision.”). See infra Part II.
35. See Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5; Rossi, supra note 2 at 405–07.
36. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20.
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work out such matters as overhauling the portfolio of power plants to reduce
carbon emissions, and it will take considerable experimentation through an
iterative process involving both sovereigns.37 This dynamic environment of
policy innovation in the electric grid is an essential backdrop to decision making
in the ZEC cases.
FERC v. EPSA, the Court’s 2016 opinion on demand response, describes
this brilliantly.38 The Court recognized that it is often impossible to characterize
an activity as purely “retail” (subject to state regulation) or “wholesale” (subject
to FERC authority).39 It stated that “wholesale and retail markets in electricity,
as in every other known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other.”40
As the Court had previously stated in ONEOK v. Learjet, states may regulate
some matters affecting both retail and wholesale markets, but FERC may as
well.41 The Court has chosen to address conflicts as they arise, rather than set a
new bright line.
The conflicts stem from the FPA’s language that purports to assign
exclusive jurisdiction to the states and FERC. When power plants bid in
wholesale markets, they are subject to FERC’s authority to approve market
structures designed to ensure “just and reasonable” wholesale rates.42 FERC
approves RTOs’ tariffs that set terms and conditions for wholesale energy
markets and capacity markets, which provide added compensation for plants that
commit to be available for years at a time. These markets are recognized for the
significant benefits they bring to the electricity grid.43 The FPA also makes
“facilities used for the generation of electric energy,” or, simply, “generation,”
subject to exclusive state authority.44 States retain jurisdiction over such matters
as determination of need for, and siting of power plants. And if a state can decide
whether a plant is needed or where it goes, it can use a credit program to support
it.45
State around-market policies therefore involve overlaps between state and
federal laws, against this backdrop of concurrent policy innovation. ZECs
resemble credits for new or existing plants that fall within state authority, but
also impact the federally-regulated wholesale markets. As the remainder of this
Part demonstrates, the Court has been clear about how conflicts of this sort

37. Welton, supra note 18, at 9 (observing that, “the question of how to manage the intersection of
state policies and regional electricity markets is likely to be a dynamic and region-specific one”).
38. For a full description of the decision and its importance, see Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and
the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC
v. EPSA].
39. FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775–76 (2016).
40. Id. at 776.
41. Id.at 776; ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
42. Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012).
43. ADAIR & LITZ, supra note 23, at 7.
44. Federal Power Act § 201(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).
45. See generally Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars, supra note 3030 (making and defending
this argument).
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should be resolved and unclear (but, this Article contends, deliberately so) about
the resolution of any specific case.
A.

Applying Conflict Preemption to ZECs

State subsidy laws and the FPA do not expressly contradict one another, so
if the former are preempted, it is by applying the doctrine of implied preemption.
Preemption analysis ordinarily begins with Congress’ purpose in enacting the
law, and the language and framework of the statutory and regulatory scheme.
The first form of implied preemption is “field preemption,” under which courts
hold that Congress has delegated to the federal actor the exclusive right to occupy
the entire field,46 and conflicting state law must yield. The second form is
conflict preemption. As the Court stated in ONEOK, “conflict pre-emption”
requires federal law to prevail over state law where “‘compliance with both state
and federal law is impossible,’” or where “the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”47 This type of inquiry is frequently criticized for its
indeterminacy.48
Ari Peskoe demonstrates that applying field preemption to the ZEC cases
would be unwarranted and inconsistent with the reality of concurrent
jurisdiction.49 Given the interdependence between actors in the electric grid and
the FPA’s allocation of authority to states, there is no reason to believe that
Congress intended FERC to be the sole arbiter in these situations.50 And parsing
the FPA for indications of a clear Congressional purpose to preempt all state
activity would complicate this further. The statute has not changed much since
its enactment in 1935, and hardly could have foreseen the advent of the modern
electricity markets.51
As for conflict preemption, the Court decisions do not explicitly mention it;
in ONEOK, for example, the parties did not argue it.52 However, courts should
consider the principles that the Court enunciates in the three cases to be the
functional equivalent of conflict preemption analysis and use them as
46. As the Court stated in ONEOK, this means that Congress has “‘foreclose[d] any state regulation
in the area,’ irrespective of whether state law is consistent or inconsistent with ‘federal standards.’” and
“has forbidden the State to take action in the field that the federal statute pre-empts.” ONEOK, Inc., 135
S. Ct. at 1595 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 401 (2012)).
47. ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (citing California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 100,
101 (1989)).
48. Scholars have criticized conflict preemption for reaching inconsistent results in many cases
because (among other reasons) it relies upon an interpretation of the underlying statutes. See generally
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).
49. Ari Peskoe, State Clean Energy Policies at Risk: Courts Should Not Preempt Zero Emission
Credits for Nuclear Plants, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. CURRENTS (2018).
50. Rossi, supra note 2, at 454 (stating that, “It is time for the Court to recognize that field
preemption, long celebrated in energy regulation, is an anachronism that should no longer have a role in
modern preemption analysis under these statutes”).
51. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 4.
52. ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1602; Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note
5Error! Reference source not found., at 6.
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cornerstones of a preemption inquiry. As a practical matter, the Court seems to
be moving toward establishing conflict preemption as the norm.53 The Court has
created a roadmap for resolving conflicts between state and federal electricity
laws, with much to say about which state activities interfere impermissibly with
federal authority over wholesale markets. One small caveat is necessary. The
Court has redefined the jurisdictional line so comprehensively that courts should
be reluctant to rely on doctrine from the past. In particular, pre-1990 decisions
that precede the advent of the wholesale markets are questionable sources of
principles to govern the jurisdictional split in the modern market setting. Simply
repeating principles from those cases as controlling here has serious potential to
create unwanted dissonance, as older cases often cannot easily be analogized to
the current setting without understanding critical underlying factual differences.
B.

Paradigmatic Situations of Preemption Under the Supreme Court’s New
Doctrine

Courts may resolve some tension between state and federal law within the
contours of the Supreme Court’s guidance in the three decisions. Beginning with
ONEOK, states may not enact laws that are “aimed directly” or “have their
target” at the wholesale markets.54 Courts must consider “the target at which the
state law aims in determining whether [the] law is pre-empted.”55 Under FERC
v. EPSA, FERC, and not the states, has jurisdiction over “practices” that “directly
affect” wholesale rates.56 Under Hughes, a state law is preempted as an
impermissible invasion of FERC’s regulatory turf if it is “adjusting an interstate
wholesale rate.”57 And, also under Hughes, once FERC has approved a market
structure as just and reasonable, states may not conclude otherwise.58 For
example, a state cannot “condition payment [of funds] on capacity clearing the
[wholesale] auction.”59 State laws that are “untethered to wholesale market
participation,” however, are not preempted.60

53. Two prominent energy law scholars have recently concluded that the new decisions represent
a movement toward a conflict preemption approach. Emily Hammond, Response, Hughes v. Talen Energy
Marketing, LLC: Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries – Take Three, GEO. WASH. L. REV.
DOCKET (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-lawsjurisdictional-boundaries-take-three/ (noting that, “Arguably, the Court engaged in a conflict analysis as
a functional matter, notwithstanding its disavowal of such an approach.”); Rossi, supra note 2, at 456. In
that light, Jim Rossi reconceptualizes two significant pre-1990 cases as conflict preemption decisions, and
not field preemption as they are commonly understood. Rossi, supra note 2, at 456.
54. ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1600.
55. Id.at 1599.
56. FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016).. For a discussion of the decadeslong origin of this standard, see Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra
note 4.
57. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016).
58. Id.at 1298–99.
59. Id.at 1299.
60. Id.at 1299. See Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 20, for a discussion
of this language.
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This imprecise language only begins the inquiry. ONEOK’s “aimed at” and
“target” language is inartfully phrased, but it reflects the Court’s paramount
concern that states may not interfere with the wholesale markets. The Court
distinguished “‘traditional’ state regulation, such as state blue sky laws” from
laws “aimed at natural-gas companies in particular.”61 Laws that regulate
businesses generally should be permissible, but laws “aimed” at the wholesale
markets should not. Applying this test to states’ ZEC programs is
straightforward. Unlike antitrust law, which is broadly applicable, ZECs only
impact electricity generators. And the states reference and aim to affect what
happens on wholesale markets, so their aim is clear.
Second, a state cannot interfere with FERC’s “practices affecting rates”
jurisdiction, as defined in FERC v. EPSA. This statutory language gives FERC
authority over practices that “directly” affect wholesale rates.62 Under this FPA
provision, as courts interpret it, FERC has authority over much more than the
rates in wholesale markets. FERC governs the terms and conditions that
determine how electricity, the capacity to generate it, and related ancillary
services are exchanged there. The direct impact can be on market parameters and
not just on the actual monetary amounts exchanged for electricity. FERC has
authority over matters closely related to wholesale rates, but not over actions
with trivial impacts on the markets.63
A direct action need not have an immediate impact on markets, as there can
be intermediate steps.64 FERC v. EPSA’s discussion of demand response
provides the quintessential example. As the Electric Power Supply Association
notes, “[d]emand-response transactions do not even involve the sale of wholesale
electricity, yet the Court held that FERC had jurisdiction because demand
response ‘directly affects’ wholesale rates.”65 The D.C. Circuit characterized
demand response as a retail customer’s decision to cut back demand, which it
believed was within exclusive state jurisdiction over retail sales. The Court
disagreed. If a customer agreed with an intermediary to cut demand, and that
demand reduction was subsequently offered in the wholesale energy market, it
would affect the price. Indeed, the Court could not “think of a practice that”
affected wholesale rates “more.”66 FERC v. EPSA made no new law on this

61.
62.

ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1600.
Federal Power Act § 206, 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2012); see Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority
to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1814.
63. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1830–33
(discussing Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); Rossi, supra
note 2, at 460.
64. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1829.
65. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss at 18, FERC v. Elec. Pwr.
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 17-CV-1164).
66. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 775; see Eisen, FERC v. EPSA, supra note 38.
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point, as there is a decades-long history of interpreting “directness” in this
fashion.67
And “directness” can be present even if an entity over which FERC does
not have jurisdiction – a state, for example – takes an underlying action. The
Court’s rejection of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in EPSA is telling on this point.
A state cannot segment off only those aspects of its actions that fall exclusively
within its jurisdiction, if a causal chain leads to direct impacts on wholesale
rates.68 Actions with direct impacts may be precluded if there is a close
relationship to wholesale rates, even if intermediate steps are uncertain to happen
or require actions by other entities.69 Besides demand response, other examples
include the transmission planning requirements and elimination of the federal
right of first refusal embodied in FERC’s landmark rule, Order 1000. Neither of
these immediately change wholesale rates, but both were upheld as proper
exercises of FERC’s jurisdiction.70 FERC recently reiterated this concept of
directness in an Order explaining its authority over state energy efficiency
resources bid into the wholesale markets.71
Finally, Hughes invalidated a Maryland program involving a “contract for
differences.” Maryland solicited proposals for a new power plant in a specific
location, because it was unhappy with the wholesale markets’ perceived failure
to provide incentives for new plants. It guaranteed the winning bidder in an
auction that utilities and other load-serving entities would make up the difference
between the contract price and the wholesale capacity market price.72 This was
a two-way ratchet: “[i]f the natural gas-fired power were compensated by the
market less than the guaranteed amount, purchasers in-state had to pay the
difference. By contrast, if the power cleared the market for more than the
guaranteed amount, the generators would refund that difference to ratepayers.”73
The Court found that Maryland had interfered with FERC’s authority by tying
the compensation to an amount above wholesale market prices.74
As Professor Emily Hammond notes, the Court was not limiting its holding
to the specific Maryland program, as it found a number of problems with it:
67. Rossi, supra note 2, at 459 (calling this principle “well established as a limit on FERC’s
jurisdiction”); see generally Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra
note 4.
68. The Court held that FERC could properly make Order 745 within its statutory authority over
practices affecting rates. Rossi, supra note 2, at 459. The reverse holds as well: if a state takes an action
that falls within FERC’s direct authority over the markets, it can preempt it. Id. Jim Rossi correctly notes
that causation is “best understood as a pragmatic requirement for FERC to make factual and policy
findings, not as a fixed judicial or common law threshold a court can articulate in the abstract.” Id.
69. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1829.
70. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding provisions of
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities,
Order 1000, 18 C.F.R. pt 35 (2011)).
71. Order on Petition For Declaratory Order, Advanced Energy Economy, 161 FERC ¶ 61,245
(2017).
72. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 10.
73. Hammond, supra note 5, at 12.
74. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016)..
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The reasoning is not altogether clear because the Court noted a variety of
flaws at various points in the opinion, among them: (1) the statute is preempted
because “by adjusting an interstate wholesale rate, Maryland’s program invades
FERC’s regulatory turf,” (2) states may not enact measures “aimed directly” at
FERC-jurisdictional markets, (3) once FERC has approved a market as just and
reasonable, states may not conclude otherwise, and/or (4) Maryland could not
condition payment on capacity clearing the wholesale auction.75
The Court distinguished the Maryland program from “various other
measures States might employ to encourage development of new or clean
generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction
of state-owned facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector.”76 These are
“untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation,” although it is
unclear what the Court meant by this language. The Court expressly declined to
rule on preemption of such incentives.77 As discussed more fully below, that may
be a deliberate signal of an overall judicial inclination: if a state law disregards
wholesale rates by creating a link or “tether” to the wholesale markets, the
program will fall.
II. A TEST FOR ZEC PREEMPTION: CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF WHOLESALE
RATES
Interpreting the Supreme Court’s recent decisions is likely to be a decadeslong project, and there are monumental stakes involved in shaping the electric
grid’s future, particularly to meet the states’ asserted objective of
decarbonization.78 Before delving into this Article’s test and its application to
the ZEC programs, some observations are in order about the current decisionmaking landscape.
A.

A Call For Judicial Modesty

Concurrent electricity federalism has just become a recognized thing, and
its meaning is already the subject of considerable disagreement. Going forward,
there is much promise and much risk. Contemporaneous action in the absence of

75. Hammond, supra note 5, at 12–13; see Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note
5, at 10.
76. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
77. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299; Hammond, supra note 5, at 13. For a discussion of how this leaves
space for state policy experiments, see Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 17–
19.
78. Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV.
645, 663–64 (2017) (noting that decarbonization “stands to be one of the most significant economic
transformations the economy has experienced in the last century”); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson,
Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810,
812 (2016) (“[D]ecarbonizing the electric power sector is far and away the most important component of
any effort to meet ambitious U.S. [greenhouse gas] reduction targets
by 2050 and beyond.”). See generally Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621
(2015).
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clear standards can yield synergistic results,79 but it will also inevitably produce
misunderstandings or discord. Two sovereigns acting independently and
simultaneously can create friction in many different ways. They could
misinterpret the Court’s language. Their governance processes, designed with
insufficient attention to regulating jurisdictional boundaries,80 could lead them
to conflicting results. They could rely on different goals and reach incompatible
policy results. They could know the other sovereign’s goals and deliberately
disregard them. Or the conflict could arise from a combination of any of these
and more.
The Court’s flexible guidance skillfully recognizes the multiplicity of
possibilities: it highlights the interdependent nature of state and federal actors
and neither sets bright lines nor overlooks consideration of either sovereign’s
interests. Yet that does not tell us what a reviewing court should do in specific
situations. To begin with, this exceedingly complex landscape calls for judicial
modesty. Courts should avoid definitive conclusions about what the Supreme
Court’s language does or does not mean.81 Star and Zibelman repeatedly assert
that one or more decisions (particularly Hughes) is clearly and unequivocally
limited to its specific facts.82 In light of the Court’s imprecision, that can hardly
be the case. And sweeping pronouncements walling off large classes of activities
to one actor’s exclusive jurisdiction are incompatible with the Court’s intention
to resolve conflicts as they arise.
Yet the lack of an obvious bright line makes the ZEC cases exquisitely
difficult to decide. It would be unwise to crudely override either actor’s policy
goals, if that is not necessary. On the other hand, an actor’s reliance on its stated
goals cannot be the sole touchstone for decision making, particularly when policy
objectives diverge, as they often will. For that matter, preemption analysis rests
on a judgment about Congressional intent, and does not allow states to rest solely
on their policy justifications.83
79. Rossi, supra note 2, at 453 (observing that, “[r]ecognition of concurrent jurisdiction would
allow for federal regulation of energy markets without automatically preempting state experimentation
and, especially, state approaches that advance the same goals federal regulators have endorsed”).
80. Welton, supra note 1818, at 41 (discussing the inadequacy of RTO governance systems in this
regard and noting that, “There is, in sum, a byzantine set of dynamics facing RTO efforts to integrate state
decarbonization aims.”).
81. Hammond, supra note 5, at 15; Welton, supra note 18, at 7 (noting that, “Hughes left open
significant questions regarding how much overlap there can be between regional market functions and
state policy aims”).
82. As an example, Zibelman stated the following: “Hughes clearly stated that the impermissible
tether was ‘to a generator’s wholesale market participation,’ id. at 1299 (emphasis added), and nowhere
stated, implied or even considered that a State program’s incorporation of the wholesale market price
would provide a basis for preemption.” Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554,
569 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017). In a subsequent footnote, the court
stated, ”The Court finds no basis to conclude that consideration of wholesale prices (whether forecast or
actual) in pricing a subsidy is material to the preemption analysis.” Id. n.15.
83. While there is considerable discussion about the nature of preemption and how it operates, the
nature of the inquiry is grounded in the meaning of the statutory text. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The
Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 7 SUP. CT. REV.
253, 270–71 (2012).
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A Proposed Decision Rule: Allow the Sovereigns To Proceed
Independently As Long As Neither Targets the Other

A useful decision rule would allow the states and FERC to proceed
independently as long as neither attempts to consciously disregard the other. This
rule addresses the most troubling situations in a system of concurrent
jurisdiction: when one actor values independence to the exclusion of
interdependence. The states and FERC will be intertwined for years to come in
decision making about clean energy policies. Encouraging one to force the other
to change, or to claim the impact is minimal because that actor can do whatever
is necessary to adjust to the other’s program,84 is a recipe for constant litigation.
Preserving the ability to adjust to changed circumstances is especially critical in
working toward a clean energy future, because we must expect an iterative
process of policy development, with continuing dialogues as necessary.
It is especially unwise to allow one actor to insist upon correcting what it
sees as flaws of the other’s approach, as it ignores any opportunity to make
adjustments without coercion. Allowing states to operate unilaterally in spite of
the markets, for example, overlooks potential fixes.85 Some RTOs are currently
addressing the markets’ failure to internalize environmental externalities, the
precise issue that ZEC proponents target.86 And a growing number of
commentators believe that FERC can approve market rule revisions to price
carbon.87
The focus on conscious disregard has many advantages. Given the
extraordinary variety of states’ clean energy policies, it is nearly impossible to
define any other boundary between permissible and impermissible actions.
Indeed, several commentators have stated that working with the Court’s

84. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16–17, Village of Old Mill Creek, et al. v. Star, No. 17-2445
(2017) (demonstrating that this proposition is contradicted in the case of ZECs by FERC’s statement in
its notice of the technical conference on state and federal policies that the ability to harmonize them is an
“open question”). See Farmer, supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the technical conference).
85. For an interesting proposal in this regard, see generally Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating
Preemption In Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2016) (criticizing the all or nothing approach
of current preemption and recommending disaggregation of energy decisions into subunits for preemption
analysis).
86. The ISO-New England, New York ISO, California ISO, and PJM RTOs are at various steps of
considering the integration of state policies generally, and carbon pricing in particular. JUSTIN GUNDLACH
AND ROMANY WEBB, CARBON PRICING IN NEW YORK ISO MARKETS: FEDERAL AND STATE ISSUES iii
n.1 (2017); Hammond, supra note 5, at 7–8 (detailing the efforts in PJM and ISO-New England); Power
Shift,
Webinar
on
Carbon
Pricing
in
RTO
Markets
(Oct,
31,
2016),
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/webinar-carbon-pricing-rto-markets/; but see generally Welton,
supra note 18 (arguing against proceeding in this fashion).
87. See, e.g., Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale
Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 11–12 (2017); Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp,
Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 276 (2014); Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 44, at 1829; Steve Weissman &
Romany Webb, Addressing Climate Change Without Legislation: How the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Can Use Its Existing Legal Authority to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Increase
Clean Energy Use, 2 BERKELEY ENERGY & CLIMATE INITIATIVE 2–5 (2013).
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language may become a “never-ending exercise.”88 By contrast, the rule
articulated here would limit preemption to the most obvious situations on which
the Court focused its attention. It eschews setting a new jurisdictional bright line,
and preserves the traditional authorities of each sovereign to engage in
experimentation with clean energy policies as long as it does not target the other.
Another advantage is relative ease of administrability. The factual
determinations required to establish disregard will be found in declarations of the
state’s intent. A reviewing court would need to look beyond proffered
justifications for a program and examine legislative history or the record of an
administrative proceeding,89 but courts are often better equipped to do this than
to parse through complex nuances of market interactions. Evidence of
impermissible targeting, as discussed more fully below, may be found in a
reference to wholesale market prices in the support formula.90 It may also be
found in a state legislative or administrative record that justifies the support on
the basis of making up a revenue shortfall. This analysis is likely to lead to fewer
judicial errors, although it still would involve line-drawing challenges in close
cases.
The Court’s decisions lead almost inexorably to delineating preemption in
this fashion. Consider how the Court dwells on protecting the wholesale markets
from interference. ONEOK distinguished between a “challenge [to] the
reasonableness of . . . rates expressly approved by FERC” and a state law that
regulates “background marketplace conditions that affected both jurisdictional
and nonjurisdictional rates.”91 If the state “challenges” the work that FERC and
the RTOs have done, it finds it unsound – or, in other words, disregards it.
Similarly, Hughes precluded more than adding a sweetener on top of the
wholesale rate or conditioning a credit on clearing a market.92 It spoke to
“adjusting” wholesale rates – no state can tinker with, tweak, alter, or disregard
them. This comports with ONEOK, FERC v. EPSA, and previous decisions
holding that states may not independently “substitut[e] their own determinations
of what would be just and fair” wholesale rates.93 No one state policy can be said
to do that exclusively, although allowing states to substitute administrative
processes for markets to establish plants’ revenue is the epitome of this.
Hughes’s final paragraphs about state subsidies “untethered” to the markets
are a useful proxy for distinguishing permissible actions from impermissible
ones. Property tax subsidies are not designed to consciously disregard the
wholesale markets, because they do not target or reference them. Some broad-

88.
89.

Hammond, supra note 5, at 15.
Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 17–20 (illustrating a hypothetical
inquiry into a state tax exemption, and the inquiry into ZECs).
90. Id. at 21.
91. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1602 (2015).
92. Supra note75 75 and accompanying text.
93. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum
In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 65, at 20 (quoting this language).
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based subsidies might have substantial impacts on wholesale markets,94 but
financial impact alone is not the touchstone for analysis. The Zibelman court got
this completely wrong,95 and also erred by reading the word “participation” in
Hughes’ “untethered to wholesale market participation” language literally.
Under its logic, state laws that explicitly require that subsidy recipients
participate in wholesale markets are the only ones preempted.96 This is not at all
consistent with Hughes, or with FERC v. EPSA’s directness test.
Taking all of this together, none of it empowers a state to attempt to correct
perceived flaws of the wholesale markets. On the contrary, courts disfavor state
programs that aim to interfere with the structure and operation of the markets,
notwithstanding any laudable purposes. Courts have consistently held that FERC
and the RTOs have the sole authority to decide whether the wholesale markets
must change to achieve competitive outcomes.97 And courts should decline to
uphold ZECs simply because states wish to value attributes not recognized in the
wholesale markets. This would elevate conscious disregard to a governing
principle and encourage other states to pursue around-market policies. Taken to
its limits, this could completely undermine the markets. As the PJM RTO Market
Monitor pithily put it, “subsidies are contagious.”98
C.

Under the Proposed Test, ZECs Are Preempted

This section builds on the previous two, outlining a test that calls for
preemption of a state’s electricity law when a state acts in disregard of the
wholesale markets. If a state law explicitly aims to directly change wholesale
market prices, terms or conditions, its subsidy program should be impermissible
as an intrusion on FERC’s regulatory turf. If it does not, its program should pass
muster, even if it might impact the markets. This test brings together three
distinct concepts. First, a state cannot “aim” its subsidy law at the wholesale
markets, as in ONEOK. Second, FERC, not the states, has authority over the
terms, conditions, and results on wholesale markets, under FERC v. EPSA’s
directness standard. And finally, targeting wholesale rates is what the Supreme
Court found problematic in Hughes, among other defects of the Maryland

94. Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 572 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (noting that, “Plaintiffs even concede that such measures
‘would have some of the same effects’ on the market.”); Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra
note 5, at 18 (discussing the potential for a hypothetical tax subsidy to have a substantial or even equivalent
effect on wholesale prices).
95. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 568 (misinterpreting the Hughes standard by focusing on the
magnitude of the subsidies).
96. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 568.
97. An example of this is the line of cases upholding designs – and redesigns – of regional capacity
markets. See, e.g., Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, No. 16-1234 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2017); Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 4, at 1825–27 (discussing FERC’s
authority over capacity markets). Cf. Rossi, supra note 2, at 454 (noting that the transmission planning
decisions “are pragmatic choices about the best institutional balance for regulating modern energy
markets—decisions that Congress has delegated to FERC in recognition of its expertise”).
98. MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM v. 2, at 2 (2016).
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program. Applying this test to state ZEC programs, this Article finds ZECs
violate all three principles and should be preempted.
Under ONEOK’s “aim” test, the states’ inquiry into the reasonableness of
wholesale rates is impermissible.99 A formula that changes credit prices in line
with wholesale market prices aims at those rates. It is immaterial that the
targeting is not exactly the same as in the Maryland program, where the state
contract made up the entire revenue shortfall. The key concept is attempting to
target the result that prevails in the wholesale markets, which “regulate[s] in
areas where FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and
reasonable wholesale rates.”100
ZECs have a direct impact on wholesale prices.101 For the nuclear plants to
receive them, they “must operate and sell their output in the market and displace
the output and the emissions associated with the output of other units.”102 The
Illinois price adjustment formula “ensur[es] that the ZEC price decreases if
wholesale market prices increase and increases (up to a cap) if wholesale market
prices decrease.”103 That is a direct effect on the markets, even if it does not
effectuate a dollar for dollar change in wholesale prices. Nothing in FERC v.
EPSA requires that. New York and its supporters argue that it is only forecasting
future wholesale rates,104 which would limit interference with FERC’s authority
to situations where today’s wholesale rates were actually changed. FERC v.
EPSA does not hold this, either.
Star and Zibelman assert the flawed premise that a state program can
directly affect wholesale markets only if it immediately changes market prices.
Star states that, “the ‘tether’ in this case is not to wholesale participation or
transactional pricing; the tether is to broader, indirect wholesale market
forces.”105 Zibelman distinguishes “state actions that affect the wholesale price
in some way” from “state actions that set the wholesale rate,” with the former
being permissible.106 To both courts, any action at least one step removed from

99. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1602 (2015) (citing Miss. Power & Light, 487
U.S. at 374).
100. Id.
101. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 57, Electric Power Supply Association, et al. v. Star, No. 172445 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2017) (noting that under the Illinois ZEC program, “Because the favored plants
are guaranteed a rate of $47.90 per MWh across a wide range of market-clearing prices, Clinton and Quad
Cities will bid all of their output into the MISO and PJM energy auctions for the next decade.”).
102. Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 2.
103. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 64, at 17; Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 101, at 7 (“As auction prices decrease, the ZEC subsidy increases, and
vice versa, thereby guaranteeing that the plants will be paid for wholesale electricity sales at the rate
Illinois prefers, despite the prices resulting
from the PJM and MISO auctions.”).
104. See, e.g., Brief of the Institute For Policy Integrity as Amicus Curiae Supporting DefendantsAppellees at 23, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 17-2654-cv (2nd Cir. Nov. 27, 2017).
105. Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, 2017 WL 3008289, at *13 (N.D. Ill.), appeal docketed, No.
17-2445 (7th Cir. July 18, 2017).
106. Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017)
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actually adding an amount to wholesale prices is not direct.107 FERC v. EPSA
rejected this argument; as the PJM Market Monitor’s brief in the Star appeal
notes, “[t]he concept of ‘indirect wholesale market forces’ is not defined. There
is no such thing in this case.”108
Similarly, proponents claim that ZECs are traded in a separate transaction
and are therefore independent of the markets and beyond FERC’s reach.109 This
is not correct. FERC’s “directness” authority extends beyond market
transactions, and ZECs impact prices through a causal chain no less direct than
a demand response bid through an intermediary. A state is not allowed to saw off
one link in the causal chain, claim its law has only that effect, and then argue its
action is permissible. And, as also noted above, the directness is most apparent
when the state’s purpose is precisely to change what transpires on the markets.
As in Hughes, the state pricing formulas expressly tether ZECs to the
wholesale markets. One recent analysis puts it succinctly, stating that, “it is hard
to see how [ZECs] can survive Hughes. Essentially, these states have tethered
compensation for merchant plants to the wholesale markets, and have done so
for the purpose of making up for flaws in those markets.”110 The states argue that
ZECs are not tethered to the markets because no plant that receives the credits is
forced to bid into wholesale markets. It would be a stretch to limit Hughes to
situations of this sort. It also ignores reality to say that bidding is a “business
decision,” as the Zibelman court put it.111 The states’ aim to make up for revenue
shortfalls contradicts this. These plants offer some or all of their electricity in the
markets— they would have no revenues and would fail if they did not bid their
electricity there. The states cannot simultaneously attempt to make up for the
plants’ revenue shortfall, and pretend that the shortfall does not exist because the
plants are not obligated to bid. The states’ own mathematical formulas that show
they are expressly contemplating that plants will bid in the markets also undercut
their argument. They take wholesale prices into account, and there would be no
reason to do so if that was irrelevant to the plants’ owners.
The Star court’s observation that the wholesale markets can – and must –
adjust to the impacts on markets resulting from the states’ credit programs
completely inverts the relevant analysis under FERC v. EPSA. If a state program
thwarts the purposes and objectives of the wholesale market design, it is not
relevant that the grid operators could adjust their market structures to yield
satisfactory results. Once FERC has approved a market structure as just and
reasonable, it is not for the states to conclude otherwise.112 It is the point of being
forced to revise the structure, due to a state program that has this as its aim, that
is relevant.
107.
108.
109.

Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *13; Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 571–72.
Brief of Independent Market Monitor for PJM, supra note 18, at 5–6.
See, e.g., Brief of the Institute For Policy Integrity, supra note 104, at 22 (calling it a “wholly
separate” payment).
110. Hammond, supra note 5, at 15.
111. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 570.
112. Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
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Finally, Zibelman cites the Second Circuit’s 1985 Rochester Gas
decision113 in contrast to Hughes, but that decision does not refute Hughes and
is actually consistent with this Article’s test. In that case, the utility wished to set
retail rates while acknowledging the revenues that it would receive from certain
“incidental sales” (bilateral wholesale transactions).114 There was no suggestion
that the utility aimed to change any terms or conditions of those sales.115 The
utility was not attempting to “adjust” a wholesale rate, but was merely
acknowledging the end product of the wholesale rate making process. It was not
creating a feedback mechanism, as the incidental sales would not be affected in
any way by retail rate setting.116 This, the court properly stated, was permissible.
This result is consistent with the test expressed in this Article, as the state action
involved no disregard. It also squares with Supreme Court’s “trapping” cases
such as Mississippi Power and Light117 that were decided contemporaneously to
Rochester Gas. In these cases, the Court held that utilities could not disregard
wholesale rates, but instead were required to pass them through as inputs to the
retail level.
III. PREEMPTING ZECS WHILE PRESERVING THE STATES’ ABILITY TO
PROMOTE CLEAN ENERGY
Ari Peskoe (in his companion article), law professor amici, and some
environmental groups and clean energy advocates, whom one might not
normally expect to support subsidies to aging nuclear power plants, have lined
up in favor of the ZECs. Their primary concern is that preserving ZECs is
essential for the survival of other state green energy programs.118 Accordingly,
they argue that states have exclusive authority over design and implementation
of clean energy credit programs.119 This misses the mark.

113. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 569 (citing Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of New York, 754 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1985)).
114. Rochester Gas and Electric Corp., 754 F.2d at 102.
115. Id.
116. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 65, at 18 (noting
that, “Central to the Second Circuit’s holding was its finding that the policy of the New York Public
Service Commission (‘PSC’) to consider federally-regulated wholesale sales when it set statejurisdictional retail rates would not affect the wholesale-market decisions of the utility at issue.”);
Rochester Gas and Electric Corp., 754 F.2d at 102 (“[W]e do not believe that PSC’s [policies] materially
affect [the utility’s] incidental sales decisions.”).
117. Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
118. Briefs filed by environmental groups in the Seventh Circuit in support of the District Court’s
position include Amici Curiae Brief of Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund,
Citizens Utility Board, Elevate Energy and Respiratory Health Association in Support of Defendants‐
Appellees and Affirmance, Nos. 17‐ 2433, 17‐ 2445 (cons.); and Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars,
supra note 30. In the Zibelman appeal, these parties were joined by the NYU Law Institute For Policy
Integrity. See Brief of the Institute For Policy Integrity, supra note 104.
See also Welton, supra note 18, at 30 (noting that “the ZEC program divided the environmental
community, with many groups coming out in support of it.”).
119. Brief of Electricity Regulation Scholars, supra note 45.
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State Clean Energy Programs; Distinguishing ZECs

States have numerous and diverse efforts underway to promote sources of
clean and renewable power.120 They have had exclusive authority to design
programs to subsidize clean energy by mechanisms such as renewable portfolio
standards (RPS) and renewable energy certificate (REC) programs tied to
them.121 A RPS “requires electric utility companies to source a certain share of
the electricity they sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy.”122
Utilities prove their compliance with these requirements through RECs.123 A
REC is a tradeable, market-based instrument that represents a megawatt-hour of
electricity generated and delivered to the electric grid from a renewable energy
resource.124
ZECs and RECs are both credit programs that support carbon-free
generation. The similarity ends there, as there is a critical distinction between
them. ZECs aim directly at remedying the revenue shortfall on the wholesale
markets. RECs do not, because they are designed with reference to
environmental attributes, not wholesale market prices.125 RPSs promote new
sources of carbon-free generation, and “generally do not condition eligibility for
the standards (or the accompanying renewable energy credits) on participation
in the wholesale markets, nor were they motivated by correcting perceived
wholesale market failures.”126 RECs are neither traded on the wholesale markets
nor valued there.127 As the Second Circuit recently noted in its Allco decision
that upheld Connecticut’s RPS, “RECs are inventions of state property law
whereby the renewable energy attributes are ‘unbundled’ from the energy itself

120. Welton, supra note 1818, at 4 (describing the “rich set of state climate policies”). The wide
variety of policies is collected at DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY,
http://dsireusa.org.
121. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia now have RPSs. Mormann, supra note 2, at
190; DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, SUMMARY MAP: RPS
POLICIES, http://dsireusa.org.
122. Mormann, supra note 2, at 198; cf. Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?,
31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 345 (2011).
123. Mormann, supra note 2, at 198.
124. Id.
125. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 101, at 52; Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition
To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 64, at 21 (noting that, “RECs are not dependent upon or priced with
respect to the wholesale price of electricity”). This also distinguishes the Second Circuit’s recent decision
upholding Connecticut’s RPS, which, unlike ZECs, operates completely independently of the wholesale
markets. Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 926 (2018).
126. Hammond, supra note 5, at 13.
127. The Zibelman court correctly notes this. Coal. For Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp.
3d 554, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017). It then concludes that
because this is a separate transaction it cannot be said to set the wholesale rate. That does not square with
FERC v. EPSA. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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and sold separately.”128 The value of RECs depends on supply and demand for
them, and is completely unrelated to wholesale market prices.129
RPS programs subsidize renewable power generators.130 That by itself does not
make them impermissible. Like a property tax subsidy, a direct subsidy, or the
other means of supporting generation that Hughes found permissible, their value
is not linked to the wholesale markets. A REC recipient could impact the
wholesale markets by taking REC revenue into account in its bid, but the lack of
conscious aim at the markets makes this permissible. Indeed, a number of state
RPSs predate the wholesale markets, so they could not have been designed with
reference to them.
B.

Retaining Authority For Other State Clean Energy Programs

The distinction articulated in the previous section may seem like splitting
hairs, but under a test for preemption that rests on conscious disregard for the
wholesale markets, it makes all the difference. In designing an RPS, the state
proceeds with no eye on the markets. It can and should be able to do this. Thus,
courts could invalidate the ZECs while avoiding interference with state
experiments to promote clean and renewable energy. Under this test, states would
retain considerable latitude to design environmental credit programs. Arguments
that ZECs are essential for states to address climate change confuse the ultimate
issue, because New York and Illinois could easily redesign their ZEC programs
to pass muster. If they valued the emissions exclusively at the social cost of
carbon, that would be permissible under this Article’s test.131
Finally, the environmentalists supporting ZECs should prefer the conscious
disregard standard to an argument resting on states’ authority over credit
programs. Parochial programs subsidizing individual plants may not always have
environmentally friendly results. One state could tout carbon-free generation, but
another may well decide to protect coal fired power plants because the state
believes they can operate in emergency conditions and that wholesale markets
do not value “resilience” of this sort. In fact, in the last year, two states have
introduced legislation to support coal-fired power plants in their state by valuing

128. Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d at 93 (citing Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep’t of
Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183, 186 15 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). As such, different states define
RECs differently, focusing on various attributes which they deem to be especially relevant. Id.
129. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss, supra note 65, at 22 (noting
that, “the REC price is typically determined by a competitive market for renewable energy credits, not by
a state dictate based on how much the favored plant will receive from wholesale electric market sales.”).
130. Hammond & Spence, supra note 4, at 206 (noting that, “RPSs increase the price electricity
retailers are willing to pay for clean power”). The precise extent of this subsidy is unknown. Brief of
Electricity Regulation Scholars, supra note 45, at 219 (noting that, “teasing out the precise effect that state
policy and FERC-regulated wholesale rates have on REC prices involves complex calculations, and we
are not aware of any definitive conclusions. Suffice it to say, REC prices and wholesale power prices are
interrelated to varying degrees in different markets.”).
131. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 5, at 21.
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their purported resilience attributes.132 And the Department of Energy directed
FERC to consider the value of resiliency to the grid, to which FERC responded
by opening a broader proceeding on the matter.133 If states have broad authority
to craft credit programs, a “resilience” credit would be permissible. Under a
standard that focuses on disregard for the markets, a “resilience” standard might
fall, depending on its design.
CONCLUSION
The test outlined in this Article requires states to be forthright about their
incentives to promote clean energy. If nuclear power plants are unprofitable due
to low wholesale market clearing prices, a state may support them with initiatives
that fall within its traditional authorities. This Article concludes, however, that
the state may not explicitly target its program to compensate for what it believes
are dissatisfactory wholesale market outcomes. States that joined the wholesale
markets need to adhere to their results. As Shelley Welton notes, no one forced
states to participate: they “decided to join regional electricity markets in order to
have these markets competitively select least-cost electricity and generating
capacity.”134 And if a state can set the terms of the debate by attempting to make
up for market shortcomings, the overall design of the markets is threatened.
There is no “preoccupation with market sanctity” here, either.135 A test that
focuses on conscious disregard is a narrow one that would address some aroundmarket situations, but would leave considerable room for state policy
experimentation. And, as states consider how to promote clean energy, the
wholesale markets, which were designed to provide least-cost electricity, will
have to change to accommodate these policies. That would continue to leave
much uncertainty about the boundary between the two, but that is a desirable
132. Two bills (HB 239 and SB 155) were introduced in the Ohio legislature in 2017 to provide
“perpetual subsidies for two coal-fired plants.” Maloney, Feud of the Year, supra note 3; Kathiann M.
Kowalski, As Ohio legislature regroups, power plant subsidy debate to continue, ENERGY NEWS
NETWORK (Aug. 16, 2017), https://energynews.us/midwest/as-ohio-legislature-regroups-power-plantsubsidy-debate-continues/. Illinois also moved forward with legislation to support coal-fired power plants
in the state, but it failed in the 2017 legislative session. Amanda Durish Cook, Dynegy Auction Proposal
Fails to Gain Ill. Lawmaker Support, RTO INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/dynegycapacity-market-80654/.
133. Using its rarely-invoked authority under Section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization
Act (42 U.S.C. § 7173(a) (2012)), the Department of Energy directed FERC to begin a rulemaking to
recognize the “resiliency” of coal and nuclear power plants and provide them with cost-of-service
recovery. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 60134 (proposed
Oct.
10,
2017)
(to
be
codified
at
18
CRF
pt.
35),
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/09/f37/Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Rulemaking%20.pdf; see
also Gavin Bade, Chatterjee: coal plants should be ‘properly compensated’ for grid value,
UTILITYDIVE.COM (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/chatterjee-coal-plants-should-beproperly-compensated-for-grid-value/449367/. A FERC order in January 2018 rejected the rulemaking
proposal but began a new proceeding to investigate the nature of resilience and make appropriate changes
to wholesale markets. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Instituting New Proceeding, And
Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018).
134. Welton, supra note 18, at 20.
135. Hammond, supra note 5, at 15.
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outcome. That hardly spells the end of the markets,136 and for now seems
preferable to sweeping rules that establish new bright lines of their own.

136.

Id.

